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The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur.
We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger.
What a stunning achievement – or, if not achievement, what stunning good
fortune. In 1960 the British novelist C. P. Snow said on the front page of the
New York Times that unless the nuclear powers drastically reduced their nu-
clear armaments thermonuclear warfare within the decade was a “mathemat-
ical certainty.” Nobody appeared to think Snow’s statement extravagant.
We now have that mathematical certainty compounded more than four
times, and no nuclear war. Can we make it through another half dozen
decades?
There has never been any doubt about the military effectiveness of nuclear
weapons or their potential for terror. A large part of the credit for their not
having been used must be due to the “taboo” that Secretary of State Dulles
perceived to have attached itself to these weapons as early as 1953, a taboo
that the Secretary deplored. 
The weapons remain under a curse, a now much heavier curse than the
one that bothered Dulles in the early 1950s. These weapons are unique, and
a large part of their uniqueness derives from their being perceived as unique.
We call most of the others “conventional,” and that word has two distinct
senses. One is “ordinary, familiar, traditional,” a word that can be applied to
food, clothing, or housing. The more interesting sense of “conventional” is
something that arises as if by compact, by agreement, by convention. It is simp-
ly an established convention that nuclear weapons are different. 
True, their fantastic scale of destruction dwarfs the conventional weapons.
But as early as the end of the Eisenhower administration nuclear weapons
could be made smaller in explosive yield than the largest conventional explo-
sives. There were military planners to whom “little” nuclear weapons appeared
untainted by the taboo that they thought ought properly to attach only to
weapons of a size associated with Hiroshima, or Bikini. But by then nuclear
weapons had become a breed apart; size was no excuse from the curse. 
This attitude, or convention, or tradition, that took root and grew overthese past ﬁve decades, is an asset to be treasured. It is not guaranteed to sur-
vive; and some possessors or potential possessors of nuclear weapons may not
share the convention. How to preserve this inhibition, what kinds of policies
or activities may threaten it, how the inhibition may be broken or dissolved,
and what institutional arrangements may support or weaken it, deserves
serious attention. How the inhibition arose, whether it was inevitable,
whether it was the result of careful design, whether luck was involved, and
whether we should assess it as robust or vulnerable in the coming decades, is
worth examining. Preserving this tradition, and if possible helping to extend
it to other countries that may yet acquire nuclear weapons, is as important as
extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, now being renegotiated 
after its ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve years.
The ﬁrst occasion when these weapons might have been used was early in
the Korean war. Americans and South Koreans had retreated to a perimeter
around the southern coastal city of Pusan and appeared in danger of being
unable either to hold out or to evacuate. The nuclear-weapons issue arose in
public discussion in this country and in the British parliament. Clement Atlee
ﬂew to Washington to beseech President Truman not to use nuclear weapons
in Korea. The visit and its purpose were both public and publicized. The
House of Commons, considering itself to have been a partner in the enter-
prise that produced nuclear weapons, considered it legitimate that Britain
have a voice in the American decision.
The successful landing at Inchon mooted the question whether nuclear
weapons might have been used if the situation in the Pusan perimeter had
become desperate enough. But at least the question of nuclear use had come
up, and the upshot was in the negative.
There may be more than enough reasons to explain the non-use at that
time in Korea. But I do not recall that an important consideration, for the
U.S. government or the U.S. public, was apprehension of the consequences
of demonstrating that nuclear weapons were “usable,” of preempting the pos-
sibility of cultivating a tradition of non-use. 
Nuclear weapons again went unused in the disaster brought by the entry of
Chinese armies, and were still unused during the bloody war of attrition that
accompanied the Panmunjom negotiations. Whether they would have been
used, and where and how they might have been used, had the war ground on
for many more months, and what the subsequent history would have been
had they been used in North Korea or in China at that time is of course specu-
lative. Whether the threat of nuclear weapons, presumably in China rather
than on the battleﬁeld, inﬂuenced the truce negotiations remains unclear. 
McGeorge Bundy’s book, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the
First Fifty Years (1), documents the fascinating story of President Eisenhower
and Secretary of State Dulles and nuclear weapons. At the National Security
Council on February 11, 1953, “Secretary Dulles discussed the moral prob-
lem in the inhibitions on the use of the A-bomb… It was his opinion that we
should break down this false distinction” (p. 241). I do not know of any ana-
lysis of that time within the government of actions that might tend to break
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strengthen it. But evidently the Secretary believed, and may have taken for
granted that the entire National Security Council believed, that the restraints
were real even if the distinction was false, and that the restraint was not to be
welcomed.
Again on October 7, 1953, Dulles: “Somehow or other we must manage to
remove the taboo from the use of these weapons” (p. 249). Just a few weeks
later the President approved, in a Basic National Security document, the
statement, “In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear
weapons to be as available for use as other munitions” (p. 246). This state-
ment surely has to be read as more rhetorical than factual. Taboos are not
easily dispelled by pronouncing them extinct, even in the mind of one who
does the pronouncing. Six months later at a restricted NATO meeting the
U.S. position was that nuclear weapons “must now be treated as in fact having
become conventional” (p. 268). Again, saying so cannot make it so; tacit con-
ventions are sometimes harder to destroy than explicit ones, existing in po-
tentially recalcitrant minds rather than on destructible paper.
According to Bundy, the last public statement in this progress of nuclear
weapons toward conventional status occurred during the Quemoy crisis. On
March 12, 1955, Eisenhower said, in answer to a question, “In any combat
where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly mi-
litary purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you
would use a bullet or anything else” (p. 278). Bundy’s judgment, which I
share, is that this again was more an exhortation than a policy decision.
Was Ike really ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy, or Taiwan
itself? It turned out he didn’t have to. The conspicuous shipment of nuclear
artillery to Taiwan was surely intended as a threat. Blufﬁng would have been
risky from Dulles’ point of view; leaving nuclear weapons unused while the
Chinese conquered Taiwan would have engraved the taboo in granite. At the
same time, Quemoy may have appeared to Dulles as a superb opportunity to
dispel the taboo. Using short range nuclear weapons in a purely defensive
mode, solely against offensive troops, especially at sea or on beachheads de-
void of civilians, might have been something that Eisenhower would have
been willing to authorize and that European allies would have approved, and
nuclear weapons might have proved that they could be used “just exactly as
you would use a bullet or anything else.” The Chinese did not offer the op-
portunity.
On the status of nuclear weapons, the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions were a sharp contrast to the Eisenhower. There was also a change in
roles within the Cabinet. Hardly anybody born after World War II remembers
the name of Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson. But most
who have studied any American history know the name of John Foster Dulles.
A bit of research with Bundy’s book shows the contrast. In Bundy’s index
there are 31 references to Dulles, 2 to Charles Wilson. Under Kennedy and
Johnson the score is reversed: 42 references to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, 12 to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
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the Pentagon and in 1962 McNamara began his campaign – his and
President Kennedy’s – to reduce reliance on nuclear defense in Europe by
building expensive conventional forces in NATO. During the next couple of
years McNamara became associated with the idea that nuclear weapons were
not “useable” at all in the sense that Eisenhower and Dulles had intended.
Undoubtedly the traumatic October of 1962 contributed to the revulsion
against nuclear weapons of some of Kennedy’s key advisors and Kennedy
himself.
The contrast between the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson attitudes to-
ward nuclear weapons is beautifully summarized in a statement of Johnson’s
in September 1964. “Make no mistake. There is no such thing as a conven-
tional nuclear weapon. For 19 peril-ﬁlled years no nation has loosed the atom
against another. To do so now is a political decision of the highest order” (2).
That statement disposed of the notion that nuclear weapons were to be
judged by their military effectiveness. It disposed of Dulles’ “false distinc-
tion”: “A political decision of the highest order” compared with “as available
for use as other munitions.” 
I am particularly impressed by the “19 peril-ﬁlled years.” Johnson implied
that for 19 years the United States had resisted the temptation to do what
Dulles had wanted the United States to be free to do where nuclear weapons
were concerned. He implied that the United States, or collectively the United
States and other nuclear weapon states, had an investment, accumulated over
19 years, in the non-use of nuclear weapons; and those 19 years of quarantine
for nuclear weapons were part of what would make any decision to use those
weapons a political one of the highest order. 
It is worth a pause here to consider just what might be the literal meaning of
“no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon.” Speciﬁcally, why couldn’t a
nuclear bomb no larger than the largest blockbuster of World War II be con-
sidered conventional, or a nuclear depth charge of modest explosive power
for use against submarines far at sea, or nuclear land mines to halt advancing
tanks or to cause landslides in mountain passes? What could be so awful
about using three “small” atomic bombs to save the besieged French at Dien
Bien Phu as was discussed at the time? What so wrong about using nuclear
costal artillery against a communist Chinese invasion ﬂotilla in the Gulf of
Taiwan? 
There are two answers that this question has received, one mainly instinc-
tive, the other somewhat analytical, but both resting on a belief, or a feeling
– a feeling somewhat beyond reach by analysis – that nuclear weapons were
simply different, and generically different. The more intuitive response can
probably best be formulated, “If you have to ask that question you wouldn’t
understand the answer.” The generic character of everything nuclear was
simply – as logicians might call it – a primitive, an axiom; and analysis was as
unnecessary as it was futile.
The other, more analytical, response took its argument from legal reason-
ing, diplomacy, bargaining theory, and theory of training and discipline, in-
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slopes, well deﬁned boundaries, and the stuff of which traditions and implicit
conventions are made. (The analogy to “one little drink” for a recovering 
alcoholic was sometimes heard.) But both lines of argument arrived at the
same conclusion: nuclear weapons, once introduced into combat, could not,
or probably would not, be contained, conﬁned, limited.
Sometimes the argument was explicit that no matter how small the
weapons initially used the size of weapons would ineluctably escalate, there
being no natural stopping place. Sometimes the argument was that the mili-
tary needed to be disciplined, and once they were allowed any weapons it
would be impossible to stop their escalation.
The “neutron bomb” is illustrative. This is a bomb, or potential bomb, that,
because it is very small and because of the materials of which it is constructed,
emits “prompt neutrons” that can be lethal at a distance at which blast and
thermal radiation are comparatively moderate. As advertised, it kills people
without great damage to structures. The issue of producing and deploying this
kind of weapon arose during the Carter Administration, evoking an anti-nu-
clear reaction that caused it to be left on the drawing board. But the same
bomb – at least, the same idea – had been the subject of even more intense de-
bate 15 years earlier, and it was there that the argument was honed that was
ready to be used again in the 1970s. The argument was simple; and it was sure-
ly valid, whether or not it deserved to be decisive. It was that it was important
not to blur the distinction – the ﬁrebreak, as it was called – between nuclear
and conventional weapons; and either because of its low yield or because of its
“benign” kind of lethality it was feared, and it was argued, that there would be
a strong temptation to use this weapon where nuclears were otherwise not 
allowed, and that the use of this weapon would erode the threshold, blur the
ﬁrebreak, pave the way by incremental steps for nuclear escalation. 
The argument is not altogether different from that against so-called peace-
ful nuclear explosion (PNE’s). The decisive argument against PNE’s was that
they would accustom the world to nuclear explosions, undermining the be-
lief that nuclear explosions were inherently evil and reducing the inhibitions
on nuclear weapons. The prospect of blasting new river beds in northern
Russia or a bypass canal for the waters of the Nile, or harbors in developing
countries, generated concern about “legitimizing” nuclear explosions. 
A revealing demonstration of this antipathy was in the universal rejection
by American arms controllers and energy-policy analysts of the prospect of an
ecologically clean source of electrical energy, proposed in the 1970s, that
would have detonated tiny thermonuclear bombs in underground caverns to
generate steam. I have seen this idea unanimously dismissed without argu-
ment, as if the objections were too obvious to require articulation. As far as I
could tell the objection was always that even “good” thermonuclear explo-
sions were bad and should be kept that way. (I can imagine President
Eisenhower: “In any energy crisis where these things can be used on strictly
civilian sites for strictly civilian purposes I see no reason why they shouldn’t
be used just exactly as you would use a barrel of oil or anything else.” And
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use of these clean thermonuclear energy sources.”)
But it is important not to think that nuclear weapons alone have this charac-
ter of being generically different, and independently of quantity or size. Gas
was not used in World War II. The Eisenhower-Dulles argument could have ap-
plied to gas: “In any combat where these gases can be used on strictly military
targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be
used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” But as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Eisenhower, as far as
we know, never proposed any such policy.  Maybe if, at the time, he had been
put through the exercise he would have convinced himself, not that gas
should never be used but that gas was at least different from bullets, and deci-
sions on its use raised new strategic issues. And ten years later he might have
recalled that line of thinking when, I think reluctantly, he let his secretary of
state urge doing for nuclear weapons what Eisenhower apparently never
thought of doing for gas in the European theater.
Some other things have this all-or-none quality in warfare. Nationality is
one. The Chinese did not visibly intervene in the Korean war until it was time
to intervene in force. American military aid personnel have always been cau-
tioned to avoid appearing to engage in anything that could be construed as
combat, the notion being that contamination could not be contained. There
was some consideration of American intervention in Indochina at the time of
Dien Bien Phu, but not on the ground; and in the air it was thought that re-
connaissance would count less as “intervention” than would bombing. There
is typically the notion that to provide equipment is much less participatory
than to provide military manpower; we arm the Israeli and provide ammuni-
tion even in wartime, but so much as a company of American infantry would
be perceived as a greater act of participation in the war than $5 billion worth
of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts.
I mention all this to suggest that there are perceptual and symbolic phe-
nomena that persist and recur and that help to make the nuclear phe-
nomenon less puzzling. And I ﬁnd it remarkable how these perceptual con-
straints and inhibitions cross cultural boundaries. During the Chinese phase
of the Korean war the U.S. never bombed airbases in China; the “rules” were
that Chinese bombing sorties originated from North Korea, and to abide by
the rules Chinese aircraft originating in Manchuria touched wheels down at
North Korean airstrips on the way to bombing their American targets. That
reminds us that national territory is like nationality: crossing the Yalu, on the
ground or in the air, is a qualitative discontinuity. Had General MacArthur
succeeded in conquering all of North Korea, even he could not have pro-
posed that penetrating just “a little bit” into China proper wouldn’t have mat-
tered much because it was only a little bit.
Still, these qualitative all-or-none kinds of thresholds are often susceptible
to undermining. A Dulles who wishes the taboo were not there may not only
attempt to get around it when it is important, but may apply ingenuity to dis-
solving the barrier on occasions when it may not matter much, in anticipa-
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ment. Bundy suggests that in discussing the possibility of atomic bombs in de-
fense of Dien Bien Phu Dulles and Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had in mind not only the local value in Indochina but
the use of Dien Bien Phu in “making the use of atomic bombs international-
ly acceptable,” a purpose that Dulles and Radford shared.
The aversion to nuclear weapons – one might even say the abhorrence of
them – can grow in strength and become locked into military doctrine even
without being fully appreciated, or even acknowledged. The Kennedy admin-
istration launched an aggressive campaign for conventional defenses in
Europe on grounds that nuclear weapons certainly should not be used, and
probably would not be used, in the event of a war in Europe.  Throughout
the 1960s the ofﬁcial Soviet line was to deny the possibility of a non-nuclear
engagement in Europe. Yet the Soviets spent great amounts of money devel-
oping non-nuclear capabilities in Europe, especially aircraft capable of deliv-
ering conventional bombs. This expensive capability would have been utterly
useless in the event of any war that was bound to become nuclear. It reﬂects
a tacit Soviet acknowledgement that both sides might be capable of non-
nuclear war and that both sides had an interest, an interest worth a lot of
money, in keeping war non-nuclear – keeping it non-nuclear by having the
capability of ﬁghting a non-nuclear war.
Arms control is so often identiﬁed with limitations on the possession or de-
ployment of weapons that it is often overlooked that this reciprocated invest-
ment in non-nuclear capability was a remarkable instance of unacknowl-
edged but reciprocated arms control. It is not only potential restraint in the
use of nuclear weapons; it is investment in a conﬁguration of weapons to
make them capable of non-nuclear combat. It reminds us that the inhibitions
on “ﬁrst use” may be powerful without declarations, even powerful while one
party refuses to recognize its own participation for what it is. 
With the possible exception of the Anti-Ballistic-Missile treaty, this conven-
tional buildup in Europe was the most important east-west arms understand-
ing until the demise of the Soviet Union. It was genuine arms control, even if
inexplicit, even if denied – as real as if the two sides had signed a treaty oblig-
ing them, in the interest of fending off nuclear war, to put large amounts of
treasure and manpower into conventional forces. The investment in re-
straints on the use of nuclear weapons was real as well as symbolic.
That the Soviets had absorbed this nuclear inhibition was dramatically
demonstrated during their protracted campaign in Afghanistan. I never read
or heard public discussion about the possibility that the Soviet Union might
shatter the tradition of non-use to avoid a costly and humiliating defeat in
that primitive country. The inhibitions on use of nuclear weapons are such
common knowledge, the attitude is so conﬁdently shared, that not only
would the use of nuclear weapons in Afghanistan have been almost universal-
ly deplored, it wouldn’t even have been thought of.
But part of that may be because President Johnson’s nineteen-year nuclear
silence had stretched into a fourth and then a ﬁfth decade, and everyone in
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in common. “We have to ask, could that tradition, once broken, have mend-
ed itself? Had Truman used nuclear weapons during the Chinese onslaught
in Korea, would Nixon have been as impressed in 1970 by the nineteen-year
hiatus as Johnson was in 1964? Had Nixon used nuclear weapons, even ever
so sparingly, in Viet Nam would the Soviets have eschewed their use in
Afghanistan, and Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands? Had Nixon used nu-
clear weapons in 1969 or 1970, would the Israeli have resisted the temptation
against the Egyptian beachheads north of the Suez canal in 1973? ’’
The answer surely is that we do not know. One possibility is that the horror
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have repeated itself and the curse would
have descended again with even more weight. The other possibility is that,
the long silence broken, nuclear weapons would have emerged as militarily
effective instruments and, especially used unilaterally against an adversary
who had none, a blessing that might have reduced casualties on both sides of
the war as some think the bomb on Hiroshima did. Much might have de-
pended on the care with which weapons were conﬁned to military targets or
used in demonstrably “defensive” modes.
We were spared from temptation in the Gulf in 1991. Iraq was known to pos-
sess, and to have been willing to use, “unconventional” weapons – chemicals.
Had chemical weapons been used with devastating effect on U. S. forces the is-
sue of appropriate response would have posed the nuclear question. I am con-
ﬁdent that had the president, in that circumstance, deemed it essential to es-
calate from conventional weapons, battleﬁeld nuclear weapons would have
been the military choice. Nuclear weapons are what the Army, Navy, and Air
Force are trained and equipped to use; their effects in different kinds of
weather and terrain are well understood. The military profession traditionally
despises poison. There would have been strong temptation to respond with
the kind of unconventional weapon we know best how to use. To have done so
would have ended the forty-ﬁve peril-ﬁlled years. We can hope no president
has to face such a “political decision of the highest order.” I’ve no doubt any
president would recognize that that was the kind of decision he was facing.
I have devoted this much attention to where we are and how we got here
with the status of nuclear weapons in the belief that the development of that
status is as important as the development of nuclear arsenals has been. The
non proliferation effort, concerned with the development, production, and
deployment of nuclear weapons, has been more successful than most author-
ities can claim to have anticipated; the accumulating weight of tradition
against nuclear use I consider no less impressive and no less valuable. We de-
pend on non proliferation efforts to restrain the production and deployment
of weapons by more and more countries; we may depend even more on uni-
versally shared inhibitions on nuclear use. Preserving those inhibitions and ex-
tending them, if we know how, to cultures and national interests that may not
currently share those inhibitions will be a crucial part of our nuclear policy. 
I quote from an editorial that Alvin M. Weinberg, the distinguished nuclear
physicist, wrote on the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the
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that both American and Japanese lives were saved by the use of the bomb in
Japan, he gives another reason for his belief that Hiroshima (but not
Nagasaki) was fortunate. “Are we witnessing a gradual sanctiﬁcation of
Hiroshima – that is, the elevation of the Hiroshima event to the status of a
profoundly mystical event, an event ultimately of the same religious force as
biblical events? I cannot prove it, but I am convinced that the 40th Anni-
versary of Hiroshima, with its vast outpouring of concern, its huge demon-
strations, its wide media coverage, bears resemblance to the observance of
major religious holidays … This sanctiﬁcation of Hiroshima is one of the
most hopeful developments of the nuclear era.”
A crucial question is whether the anti-nuclear instinct so exquisitely ex-
pressed by Weinberg is conﬁned to “western” culture. I believe the set of atti-
tudes and expectations about nuclear weapons is more recognizably
widespread among the people and the elites of the developed countries; and
as we look to North Korea, Iran, or others as potential wielders of nuclear
weapons we cannot be sure that they inherit this tradition with any great
force. But it is reassuring that in the same way we had no assurance that the
leadership of the Soviet Union would inherit the same tradition or partici-
pate in cultivating that tradition. Not many of us in the 1950s or 60s would
have thought that were the Soviet Union to engage in war, and lose a war, in
Afghanistan it would behave there as if nuclear weapons did not exist. 
We can be grateful to them for behaving that way in Afghanistan, adding
one more to the list of bloody wars in which nuclear weapons were not used.
Forty years ago we might have thought that the Soviet leadership would be
immune to the spirit of Hiroshima as expressed by Weinberg, immune to the
popular revulsion that John Foster Dulles did not share, immune to the over-
hang of all those peril-ﬁlled years that awed President Johnson. In any at-
tempt to extrapolate western nuclear attitudes toward the areas of the world
where nuclear proliferation begins to frighten us, the remarkable conformi-
ty of Soviet and Western ideology is a reassuring point of departure.
An immediate question is whether we can expect Indian and Pakistani lead-
ers to be adequately in awe of the nuclear weapons they now both possess.
There are two helpful possibilities. One is that they share the inhibition – ap-
preciate the taboo – that I have been discussing. The other is that they will rec-
ognize, as the United States and the Soviet Union did, that the prospect of nu-
clear retaliation made any initiation of nuclear war nearly unthinkable. 
The instances of non-use of nuclear weapons that I’ve discussed were, in 
every case, possible use against a non-possessor. The non-use by the USA and
the USSR was differently motivated: the prospect of nuclear retaliation made
any initiation appear unwise except in the worst imaginable military emer-
gency, and that kind of military emergency never offered the temptation.
The experience of the USA-USSR confrontation may impress Indians and
Pakistanis; the greatest risk is that one or the other may confront the kind of
military emergency that invites some limited experiment with the weapons,
and there is no history to tell us, or to tell them, what happens next.
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or may already have acquired, some modest number of nuclear explosives.
(Libya appears to have withdrawn from contention.) Great diplomatic skill
and international cooperation will be required to suppress or discourage
their interest in acquiring such weapons. Equally great skill, or greater, will be
required to create or enhance the expectations and institutions that inhibit
the use of such weapons.
Those nineteen years have stretched to sixty. The taboo that Ike appeared
to denigrate, or pretended to denigrate, but that awed President Johnson a
decade later, has become a powerful tradition of nearly universal recognition.
The next possessors of nuclear weapons may be Iran, North Korea, or pos-
sibly some terrorist bodies. Is there any hope that they will have absorbed the
nearly universal inhibition against the use of nuclear weapons, or will at least
be inhibited by the recognition that the taboo enjoys widespread acclaim?
Part of the answer will depend on whether the United States recognizes
that inhibition, and especially on whether the United States recognizes it as
an asset to be cherished, enhanced, and protected or, like John Foster Dulles
in Eisenhower’s cabinet, believes “somehow or other we must manage to re-
move the taboo from the use of these weapons.”
There is much discussion these days of whether or not “deterrence” has
had its day and no longer has much of a role in America’s security. There is
no Soviet Union to deter; the Russians are more worried about Chechnya
than about the United States;  the Chinese seem no more interested in mili-
tary risks over Taiwan than Khrushchev really was over Berlin; and terrorists
cannot be deterred anyway – we don’t know what they value that we might
threaten, or who or where it is.
I expect that we may come to a new respect for deterrence. If Iran should,
despite every diplomatic effort or economic pressure to prevent it, acquire a
few nuclear weapons, we may discover again what it is like to be the deterred
one, not the one doing the deterring. (I consider us – NATO at the time – as
having been deterred from intervening in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.) I also consider it crucial that Iran’ leaders, civilian
and military, learn to think, if they have not already learned to think, in terms
of deterrence.
What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own
system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too pre-
cious to give away or to sell, to precious to waste killing people when they
could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation,
hesitant to consider military action. What nuclear weapons have been used
for, effectively, successfully, for sixty years has not been on the battleﬁeld nor
on population targets: they have been used for inﬂuence.
What about terrorists? Any organization that gets enough ﬁssile material to
make a bomb will require many highly qualiﬁed scientists, technologists, ma-
chinists, working in seclusion away from families and occupations for months
with nothing much to talk about except what their A-bomb might be good
for, for whom. They are likely to feel justiﬁed, by their contribution, to have
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British Parliament in 1950 considered itself, as partner in the development of
the atomic bomb, qualiﬁed to advise President Truman on any possible use
of the bomb in Korea.)
They will conclude – I hope they will conclude – over weeks of arguing,
that the most effective use of the bomb, from a terrorist perspective, will be
for inﬂuence. Possessing a workable nuclear weapon, if they can demonstrate
possession – and I expect they will be able to without actually detonating it –
will give them something of the status of a nation. Threatening to use it
against military targets, and keeping it intact if the threat is successful, may
appeal to them more than expending it in a purely destructive act. Even ter-
rorists may consider destroying large numbers of people as less satisfying than
keeping a major nation at bay.
The United States was slow to learn, but learned eventually (1961), that nu-
clear warheads require exceptionally secure custody – against accident, mis-
chief, theft, sabotage, or a Strangelove-like unauthorized adventure. There is
always a dilemma: reward violators of the Nonproliferation Treaty by offering
the technology to keep the warheads secure, or withhold the technology and
let the weapons be less secure. At least we can try to help educate the new
members of the nuclear club to what the United States did not appreciate for
its ﬁrst ﬁfteen years as a nuclear power.  
I know of no argument in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
which the Senate rejected in 1999, more powerful than the potential of that
treaty to enhance the nearly universal revulsion against nuclear weapons. The
symbolic effect of nearly 200 nations ratifying the CTBT, which is nominally
only about testing, should add enormously to the convention that nuclear
weapons are not to be used and that any nations that does use nuclear
weapons will be judged the violator of the legacy of Hiroshima. I never heard
that argument made on either side of the debate over the Treaty. When the
Treaty is again before the Senate, as I hope it will be, this major potential 
beneﬁt should not go unrecognized.
The most critical question about nuclear weapons for the United States
Government is whether the widespread taboo against nuclear weapons and
its inhibition on their use is in our favor or against us. If it is in the American
interest, as I believe obvious, advertising a continued dependence on nuclear
weapons, i.e. a U. S. readiness to use them, a U. S. need for new nuclear capa-
bilities (and new nuclear tests) – let alone ever using them against an enemy
– has to be weighed against the corrosive effect on a nearly universal attitude
that has been cultivated through universal abstinence of sixty years.
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